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I.

INTRODUCTION

Worldwide use of mobile-cellular1 technology has become
ubiquitous over the past decade in all demographic groups, especially
young children. The International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”)
confirms the rapid expansion of cellular technology, reporting an
increase in global cellular subscriptions from 15.5% of the population in
2001 to 96.2% in 2011.2 In a recent release, the ITU reported a
staggering 6.8 billion total cellular subscribers—a number fast
approaching the total global population of 7.1 billion.3 In the United
States alone, the number reaches more than 303 million.4
Accompanying this exponential growth in the use of mobile
technology are mounting concerns about the possible adverse physical
and medical effects of these devices, which expose users to
radiofrequency (“RF”) radiation.5 Wireless handheld telephones send
and receive electromagnetic energy, which is transmitted between the
cell phone antenna and base stations6 in the area from which the phone is
used to make or receive calls.7 The energy is not directional—that is, the

1

I use the terms “mobile” and “cellular” interchangeably, to refer to all kinds of
wireless hand held telephones, commonly known as “cell phones.”
2
Global ICT Developments, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION,
available for download at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx
(last visited June 25, 2013).
3
ICT Facts and Figures, ITU TELECOMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT BUREAU (Feb.
2013), http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/facts/material/ICTFactsFigures2013.pdf.
4
Nicholas P. Panayotopoulos et al., Litigation Alert: Cell Phones as Carcinogens,
DRI TODAY (May 17, 2012), http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=338.
5
Seung-Kwon Myung et al., Mobile Phone Use and Risk of Tumors: A MetaAnalysis, 27 JOURNAL OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 5565, 5566 (2009), available at
http://jco.ascopubs.org/cgi/doi/10.1200/JCO.2008.21.6366.
6
As explained in greater detail below, base stations are fixed structures that transmit
wireless signals along a network of towers. See infra pp. 6–7.
7
FAQs – Wireless Phones, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, http://
www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/faqs-wireless-phones (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).

2013]

A Tale of Two Circuits

3

signal is transmitted outwardly in all directions from the antenna.8 When
a person makes a call from a cell phone, the device converts the sound of
the caller’s voice into radiofrequency energy, or radio waves.9 Those RF
transmissions travel through the air until they reach a receiver at a nearby
base station or cell site, which then forwards the signal through the
wireless network of cell towers until it reaches a base station near the
person receiving the call.10 That base station then sends out RF waves
that are detected by the receiving cell phone’s built-in antenna, and “the
signals are changed back into the sound of a voice.”11
At certain levels, the energy generated by these RF emissions can
be harmful to humans.12 It is well established that, at high levels of
exposure, RF radiation can cause biological damage by heating human
tissue.13 Scientific studies have also found non-thermal biological effects
at relatively low levels of exposure, including changes in the immune
system, neurological effects, behavioral changes, alterations in brain
tissue and breaks in strands of deoxyribonucleic acid—that is, our
DNA.14 According to past comments by the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”), which regulates these devices, “whether or not
such effects might indicate a human health hazard is not presently
known.”15
Several prominent scientists compare the cell phone threat to the
harm caused by tobacco and asbestos, which was discovered only after
decades of use caused irremediable lung damage and untreatable cancers

8
Cellular Phones, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
http://www.dm.usda.gov/ocpm/Security%20Guide/V2comint/Cellular.htm (last visited
Sept. 7, 2013).
9
FAQs, supra note 7.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See Robert F. Cleveland, Jr. & Jerry L. Ulcek, Questions and Answers about
Biological Effects and Potential Hazards of Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields,
FCC OET Bulletin 56, 6 (4th ed. 1999), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus
/Engineering_Technology/Documents/bulletins/oet56/oet56e4.pdf;
U.S.
GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-545, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS:
TELECOMUNICATIONS—RESEARCH AND REGULATORY EFFORTS ON MOBILE PHONE HEALTH
ISSUES, at 7, 20 (2001), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d01545.pdf [hereinafter
GAO Report].
13
See Cleveland & Ulcek, supra note 12, at 6.
14
Id. at 8.
15
Id.; see also, e.g., Bruce Stutz, Are Cell Phones Safe? The Verdict Is Still Out,
YALE ENV’T 360, Aug. 2, 2010, http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2300;
Cecilia Kang, Cellphone Cancer Study Inconclusive; Researcher Urges More Study,
WASH. POST, (May 16, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/05/
cell_phone_cancer_study_produc.html.
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in thousands of people.16 This view is consistent with recent studies
warning of the dangers of cell phone use and the biological effects of RF
radiation emissions. But the results of these studies are varied and no
concrete scientific consensus has been achieved. While some studies
suggest that no significant adverse health effects are associated with RF
emissions, others posit “an increased risk for glioma, a malignant form of
brain cancer,” and other maladies from cell phone use.17 The recent
classification by the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and the
International Agency for Research on Cancer (“IARC”) of RF emissions
as “possibly carcinogenic to humans”18 has upped the ante significantly
for plaintiff lawyers, state legislators, city officials and others who see a
possible connection between cell phone use and harmful health effects,
and suggests that mobile phone users may be exposed to serious health
risks about which they are unaware.19
Although the evidence is not conclusive, many physicians and
public health researchers have warned that cell phones may increase the
risk of brain cancer and other conditions. The concern is particularly
acute for children, whose developing brains are more susceptible to RF
radiation exposure.20 Nonetheless, and despite the serious health
concerns and uncertain degree of risk, the cell phone industry has
consistently advertised and marketed their cell phones as totally “safe.”21
Any credible scientific study conclusively linking cell phone use to
health risks could fuel litigation with far-reaching implications.
However, controversy over whether federal preemption of litigation
16

See, e.g., Vini G. Khurana et al., There Is Currently Enough Evidence and
Technology Available to Warrant Taking Immediate Steps to Reduce Exposure of
Consumers to Cell-Phone-Related Electromagnetic Radiation, 35 MED. PHYSICS 5203,
5203 (2008); Council of Europe, The Potential Dangers of Electromagnetic Fields and
Their Effect on the Environment, at 1, Doc. 12608 (May 6, 2011), http://
www.saferphonezone.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Council_Europe_Report_
The_potential_dangers_of_electromagnetic_fields_and_their_effect_on_the_environment
_06_05_20116.pdf; Tumors and Cell Phone Use: What the Science Says: Hearing Before
the H. Domestic Policy S. Comm Oversight and Gov. Reform Comm.,110th Cong. 8
(2008) (statement of Ronald B. Herberman, M.D), available at http://
cellphones.procon.org/sourcefiles/Herberman_Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Herberman].
17
See, e.g., Press Release, World Health Organization IARC, IARC Classifies
Electromagnetic Fields as Possibly Carcinogenic to Humans (May 31, 2011),
www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/pr/2011/pdfs/pr208_E.pdf
[hereinafter
WHO
Press
Release].
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See Paul Scott, Is Your Life on the Line, MEN’S HEALTH (April 10, 2010),
http://www.menshealth.com/health/cellphone-risks-and-radiation
21
See infra Part IV.
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involving cell phone emissions makes such lawsuits “dead on arrival”
has resulted in conflicting decisions—and therefore unpredictable
outcomes. At least one federal Circuit Court has held that federal law
preempts state law in consumer litigation over cell phone emissions,22
while an adjacent Court of Appeals has held just the opposite.23 In
between are state court decisions finding only partial preemption of
consumer remedies and preservation of others.24
This article first addresses the technology of cell phone
communications—that is, how those transmissions work. Part II
explores medical and other scientific studies that have found a causal
link between exposure to RF emissions and biological injury, or that
have exonerated those devices from any such causal connection with the
data then available.25 Part III discusses the wireless industry’s response
to these studies. Part IV then traces the regulatory history of RF
emissions by the FCC, the agency that has primary regulatory authority
over these devices. In Part V, the article discusses the conflicting
decisions of two federal Circuit Courts of Appeals over whether federal
law preempts state law claims based on exposure to RF emissions.
Finally, Part VI concludes by reflecting on the far-reaching, and likely
unintended, consequences of decisions that have found broad federal
preemption of state consumer law claims.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CELLULAR TECHNOLOGY
A. Cell Sites
The rapid increase in cell phone use has been accompanied by the
equally rapid construction of cell sites—structures that house the
22
See, e.g., Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 133-34 (3rd Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 365 (2011).
23
See, e.g., Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 998
(2005).
24
See, e.g., Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764 (D.C. 2009).
25
Much of the survey of the medical and health studies is drawn largely from the
thorough and excellent research conducted in Kartikeya Makker, Cell Phones: Modern
Man’s Nemesis? 18 REPROD. MED. ONLINE 1 (2009) and Carol R. Goforth, A Bad Call:
Preemption of State and Local Authority to Regulate Wireless Communication Facilities
on the Basis of Radiofrequency Emissions, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 311, 345–346 (2001).
Readers are referred to those authorities for a more detailed discussion of the medical and
scientific literature. That and similar research is set forth in some detail in this article only
for purposes of giving context to and aiding in understanding the discussion of the FCC’s
regulatory activity and litigation which follows, not to persuade the reader on the
“science” involved in the health debate surrounding cell phones, which is ongoing.

6

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:1

necessary electronic transmission equipment along with the towers on
which those antennae are mounted. The FCC authorizes and regulates
those towers to support the transfer of signals between cellular devices,
creating a network of cellular access.26 For each cell site, the level of
permissible RF transmission depends on the number of radio channels
(“transmitters”) that have been authorized, and the accompanying power
of each.27 FCC regulations permit an effective radiated power (“ERP”)
of up to 500 watts (“W”) per channel, though a majority of urban and
suburban cell sites operate at an ERP of no more than 100 W per
channel.28
The signal emitted from cell towers is transmitted in a wave, toward
the horizon, which renders ground-level exposure to these emissions
relatively insignificant.29 Like any transmitter of RF energy, the
intensity, measured as “power density,” of emissions also decreases
sharply as one moves away from the antenna.30 As a result, societal
health risks associated with RF emissions from cell towers are reportedly
minimal—the greatest risk is posed to individuals who work on these
sites.31 According to FCC calculations of a “worst-case” scenario of
health risks associated with cell towers, an individual would “essentially
have to remain in the main transmitting beam [at the height of the
antenna] and within a few feet of the antenna” to experience RF exposure
that approaches FCC limits.32
B. Dosimetry of RF Emissions and Thermal Heating
“Radiation dosimetry” is a subfield of radiation exposure that
measures the radiation doses in tissue resulting from direct and indirect
radiation, like those emitted by RF waves.33 RF radiation at high enough
levels causes thermal heating of human tissue, which poses serious risks
to human health.34 For example, RF radiation emitted from a microwave
26

Cleveland & Ulcek, supra note 12, at 20–21.
See id. A typical cellular base station employs a maximum of 21 channels for each
antenna, providing an average of 63 transmitting channels per site. Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 20–21.
30
Id.
31
Cleveland & Ulcek, supra note 12,.at 21–22.
32
Id.
33
See GEORGE CARLO & MARTIN SCHRAM, CELL PHONES: INVISIBLE HAZARDS IN THE
WIRELESS AGE 21 (2002); IARC, Non-Ionizing Radiation, Part 2: Radiofrequency
Electromagnetic Fields, 102 IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC
RISKS TO HUMANS 1, 68 (2013), available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/
Monographs/vol102/mono102.pdf [hereinafter IARC, MONOGRAPHS].
34
See, e.g., Panayotopoulos et. al., supra note 4.
27
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oven operating at 100 W or more propels RF waves at 2,450 megahertz
(“MHz”)—powerful enough to thermally heat biological tissue.35 But
microwave ovens are considered safe by scientists and health experts
because FDA regulations require that these appliances be housed in
material strong enough to prevent leakage outside of the device.36
Cellular devices in the United States operate largely on 850 and 1900
MHz bands, whereas most other countries operate on 900 and 1800 MHz
frequencies—ranges still squarely in the middle of “microwave”
territory.37
Thermal heating of biological tissue also causes alterations in
cellular physiology, which impairs basic cellular processes, including
supplying nutrients to cells and cellular control functions.38 The
breakdown of these cellular functions exposes the body to many adverse
biological effects, including genetic mutations and damage to the
immune system.39 When tissue is heated significantly, the consequences
can be grave: cells die.40 This level of severe damage to biological tissue
can impair the function of entire organs, such as the kidneys and liver.41
Thermal heating of biological tissue also leads to breakdown and
deterioration of DNA.42 Because mammals have sophisticated systems
that repair DNA, this breakage does not inevitably lead to health
complications.43 If the rate of DNA breakage, however, “is greater than
the ability of the body to repair the broken DNA, serious mutations and
chromosomal anomalies can occur,” potentially leading to immune
system deficiencies, birth defects and cancer.44
RF radiation emission is regulated by measuring the specific
absorption rate (“SAR”), an expression of the amount of energy that
passes through and thus may be absorbed by a local area of human
tissue.45 SAR is expressed as the energy flow per unit of mass,46 and
may also be measured by the average amount of RF radiation emission
absorbed by the human body as a whole.47
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 19.
Id. at 20.
Makker, supra note 25, at 149.
GAO Report, supra note 12, at 7; CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 19.
CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Id.
CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 20.
For example, watts per kilogram or W/kg.
Makker, supra note 25, at 149.
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As of 1993, experts have not confirmed any harm associated with
thermal effects of RF emissions at SAR levels below 40 W/kg.48 The
FCC has regulated RF emissions in cell phones by capping allowable
SAR levels at 1.6 W/kg.49 Mobile phones in the United States operate at
a SAR ranging from .12 to 1.6 W/kg,50 so the cellular industry and
federal government therefore conclude that cell phones are “safe”
because this SAR cap of 1.6 W/kg is considerably less than the threshold
for thermal effects (40 W/kg).51 This rationale, however, fails to take
into account research studies suggesting that even at the comparatively
low RF levels, there may be adverse non-thermal health effects caused
by RF emissions from cell phones.52
III. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
The WHO classifies agents according to monographs published by
the IARC, called IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic
Risks to Humans.53 Established in 1965 and based in Lyon, France, the
IARC is the cancer-research arm of the WHO that works to identify the
causes of human cancer.54
Potential cancer-causing agents reviewed by WHO are selected by
ad hoc IARC advisory groups based on two primary criteria: (1) where
there is evidence of human exposure and (2) where there is some
evidence or suspicion of carcinogenicity.55 When an agent has been
48

CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 21.
Specific Absorption Rate (SAR) for Cellular Phones, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/specific-absorption-rate-sar-cellulartelephones (last visited Aug. 31, 2013) [hereinafter SAR for Cellular Phones].
50
Makker, supra note 25, at 211.
51
SAR for Cellular Phones, supra note 47; FAQs, supra note 7.
52
See Goforth, supra note 25, at 345–46 (citing C.K. Chou et al., Long-Term, LowLevel Microwave Irradiation of Rats, 13 BIOELECTROMAGNETICS 469 (1992)). The GAO,
the federal watchdog agency, has questioned the use of an exposure limit based solely on
the thermal effects of RF emissions that “is not designed to address the possibility of any
non-heating related effects, such as cancer.” GAO Report, supra note 12, at 20–21. The
GAO further questioned the reliability of testing procedures for RF emissions from cell
phones, observing that test results “can vary substantially” because of human error,
variations in the calibration of equipment, the “lack of standardized testing procedures”
and other “important sources of variability.” Id. at 18, 23–25.
53
See, e.g., IARC, Agents Classified by the IARC Monographs, Volumes 1–108,
INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER (July 16, 2013), http://
monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Classification/index.php [hereinafter IARC, Agents Classified].
54
Introduction to IARM Monographs Volume 102, INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR
RESEARCH ON CANCER, at 1 (May 24–31, 2011), http://www.iarc.fr/en/mediacentre/iarcnews/2011/Intr_Monog102.pdf,
55
Id. at 2.
49
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identified for further evaluation, the IARC surveys the openly available
scientific literature relevant to an assessment of the agent’s
carcinogenicity.56 The IARC then separately evaluates evidence of the
agent related to incidents of cancer in humans and in experimental
animals, designating the evidence as “sufficient,” “limited,” “inadequate”
or “evidence suggesting lack of carcinogenicity” for both of these
groups.57 The body of medical and scientific evidence is considered as a
whole, to reach an overall evaluation of the carcinogenicity of the agent
to humans. A table of the carcinogenic agent classifications used by
IARC is set forth below:58
Group

Carcinogenicity

1
2A

Carcinogenic to humans
Probably carcinogenic to
humans
Possibly carcinogenic to
humans
Not classifiable as to its
carcinogenicity to
humans
Probably not
carcinogenic to humans

2B
3
4

Total Agents
Classified
111
66
285
505
1

In May 2011, the WHO and the IARC released a report classifying
RF emissions as possibly carcinogenic to humans within Group 2B.59
The finding was based on a confirmed increased risk for neuroma, a form
of tumor that develops in human tissue, and glioma, a malignant type of
brain cancer associated with use of cellular devices.60
The implications of this determination are unclear but potentially
sweeping. France, the country in which the IARC is headquartered, had
previously imposed a ban on traditional cell phones in primary schools as
a protective measure against mounting evidence suggesting that RF

56

Id.
Id. at 2–3.
58
IARC, Agents Classified, supra note 53.
59
WHO Press Release, supra note 17.
60
See, e.g. IARC, Agents Classified, supra note 53; Kurt Straif, Non-ionizing
Radiation, Part II, Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields, IARC Monographs, Vol. 102,
http://www.collegiumramazzini.org/download/STRAIF11.pdf.
57
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emissions are particularly harmful to children.61 The ban requires
manufacturers to produce “stripped down” handsets that only have text
and no voice capabilities, in an effort to protect children, whose less
developed skulls permit greater penetration of RF radiation.62 But this
classification by the WHO is just the latest in a decades-long effort to
study the health effects of RF emissions.
A. History of Medical and Scientific Research on RF Emissions from
Cell Phones, Cell Sites and Other Facilities
Since the early 1960s, researchers have published hundreds of peer
reviewed studies that, individually and collectively, raise serious and
credible questions regarding RF radiation from cell phones and the
potential health threat it poses to cell phone users.63 These concerns are
particularly heightened when considering the deleterious effect of RF
radiation upon the ever-increasing numbers of children who will use the
devices over a more protracted period of time throughout their lifetime.64
Despite the increasing frequency of studies suggesting a link between RF
emission and numerous health hazards, the only consensus reached

61
Au Revoir. Cell Phones Banned from French Elementary Schools, WKYC
CHANNEL 3, May 27, 2009, http://www.wkyc.com/news/article/114546/0/Au-Revoir—
Cell-phones-banned-from-French-elementary-schools.
62
Id.
63
See, e.g., Goforth, supra note 25, at 337 ((citing Symposium, Biologic Effects and
Health Hazards of Microwave Radiation, Proceedings of an International Symposium,
Warsaw, October 15–18, 1973, VII (1974), available at http://www.ncbi
.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1775882/pdf/amjph00794-0077c.pdf [hereinafter Warsaw
Symposium]) (noting that studies presented at the international symposium convened in
1973 in Warsaw and tasked with examining the health effects of exposure to microwave
radiation “indicated substantial reason to be concerned about the health impact” and
emphasized the need for further research on RF emissions’ biological effects).
64
See, e.g., id. at 348 (citing A.A. Kolodynski & V.V. Kodynska, Motor and
Psychological Functions of School Children Living in the Area of Skrunda Radio
Location Station in Latvia, 180 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 87, 87 (1996)) (describing how in 1996
Latvian researchers studying the effects of exposure to a radar station operating at
frequencies of 154 to 162 MHz on children found “children living in front of the [station]
to have less developed memory and attention, slower reaction times and decreased
endurance of neuromuscular apparatus” than those not living near the facility); cf. id.
(citing Ezra Berman et al., Observations of Mouse Fetuses After Irradiation with 2.45
GHz Microwaves, 35 HEALTH PHYSICS 791, 791 (1978)) (highlighting several studies in
1978 reporting fetal anomalies associated with RF exposure at half that of the legal
standard); Makker, supra note 25, at 151 (citing R.P. Blackwell, Standards for
Microwave Radiation, 282 NATURE 360 (1979)) (noting a 1979 study indicating that
electromagnetic waves can affect fertility through thermal “microwave” effects).

2013]

A Tale of Two Circuits

11

within the scientific community is that there is not yet any conclusive
answer.65
In 2008, the National Academies of Science recognized the
inconclusiveness of the existing research and suggested that further
studies focus on such areas as the biophysical and biochemical or
molecular mechanisms of RF radiation.66 The next year, Korean
researchers who compiled and reviewed 465 articles examining a
potential connection between cell phone use and cancer found possible
evidence of such risk in the medical literature.67 In the interim, on July
21, 2008, Ronald B. Herberman, M.D., Director of the University of
Pittsburgh Cancer Institute (“UPCI”), issued a warning to all physicians,
researchers and staff at the cancer centers there to decrease their use of
cell phones due to a possible connection between RF radiation and brain
tumors.68 Later that summer, Dr. Herberman presented testimony before
a Congressional Subcommittee on “Tumors and Cell Phone Use: What
the Science Says,”69 explaining the reasoning behind the issuance of his
advisory to his colleagues at UPCI, and noting that his” review of the
literature suggest that most studies claiming that there is no link between
cell phones and brain tumors are outdated, had methodological concerns,
and did not include sufficient numbers of long-term cell phone users to
find an effect . . . .”70 Dr. Herberman advocated severe restrictions on
cell phone use by children,71 and warned against the lessons of tobacco
65
Compare Goforth, supra note 25, at 352 (citing Warsaw Symposium) (describing
how studies presented in Warsaw found changes in the functions of the nervous and
cardiovascular systems connected to prolonged, low intensity exposure to microwaves),
with Int’l Comm’n on Non-Ionizing Radiation Prot., Health Issues Related to the Use of
Hand-Held Radiotelephones and Base Transmitters, 70 HEALTH PHYSICS 587, 589
(1996), available at http://www.icnirp.de/documents/radiotelephones.pdf [hereinafter
ICNIRP] (citing Philip E. Hamrick et al., Thermal Denaturation of DNA Exposed to 2450
MHz CW Microwave Radiation, 56 RADIATION RESEARCH 400 (1973)) (finding no such
DNA damage as a result of exposure to RF radiation); compare Makker, supra note 25, at
149 (citing Kari Tahvanainen et al., Cellular Phone Use does not Acutely Affect Blood
Pressure or Heart Rate of Humans, 25 BIOELECTROMAGNETICS 73 (2004)) (noting 2004
study reporting no significant change in blood pressure or heart rate due to cell phone
exposure), with EMR Policy Inst. Comment, at 41, A National Broadband Policy for Our
Future, GN Docket No. 09-51, FCC Rcd. (June 2009), available at http://
www.emrpolicy.org/news/headlines/emrpi_comment_gn_09_51_fcc_09_31.pdf.
[hereinafter EMR Policy Inst.] (finding heightened risk of developing malignant tumors
in people exposed to RF radiation from mobile phone transmitter antennas).
66
EMR Policy Inst., supra note 65, at 29.
67
Myung et al., supra note 5, at 5565.
68
See Herberman, supra note 16, at App. A.
69
Id. at 9.
70
Id. at 5–6.
71
Id. at 7
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and lung cancer, where “debates over whether there was a true increase
in lung cancer associated with smoking raged far longer than they should
have, fomented by an active disinformation campaign which delayed for
decades exposure of that causal link.72
In 2010, the International Journal of Epidemiology published the
highly anticipated and widely reported “Interphone Study,” the largest
study to date on the possible link between mobile phone use and brain
tumors, conducted in 13 countries over a 10-year-period.73 The study
found no statistically significant increase in brain tumor risks associated
with normal use of mobile phones, but found “suggestions of an
increased risk of developing glioma—generally a malignant tumor
type—on the side of the head where the cell phone is held” from more
extensive exposure.74 As for the possible adverse health effects of long
term heavy use of cell phones, the researchers concluded that any such
connection requires further investigation.75 Critics of the study
immediately attacked its conclusions, alleging design flaws and
protocols, while also noting that the latency period for manifestation of
cancers might be decades long and could not be captured in any human
study.76 Even before it was published, a collaborative group of scientists
and medical researchers from more than a dozen countries issued a
preemptive attack on the report. Specifically, the critics challenged the
methodologies employed by the study’s researchers, noting that the study
took four years to draft amid “internal squabbling” among its researchers
about its own conclusions. Similarly problematic were the Interphone
Study’s exclusion of children and young adults from the research pool, in
addition to cancer victims who had died or were too ill to respond to
researcher’s questions. Finally the critics charged that the study was
flawed due to its partial funding by the wireless industry as well as the
fact the there was a decrease in brain tumors among normal cell phone
users compared to study participants who used corded phones—a finding
that even the study’s own researchers declared not statistically

72

Id. at 8.
Press Release, IARC, Interphone Study reports on Mobile Phone Use and Brain
Cancer Risk (May 17, 2010), www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/pr/2010/pdfs/pr200_E.pdf; see
Andrew Schneider, Is Your Cell Phone’s Radiation Level Safe? Don’t Call the FCC,
AOL NEWS (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.aolnews.com/2011/03/14/is-your-cell-phonesradiation-level-safe-dont-call-the-fcc/.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
73
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“plausible.”77 The Interphone Study Group itself recognized the study’s
methodological limitations, noting that bias and errors prevented any
firm conclusion with regards to causation.78 Nevertheless, the FDA
swiftly issued a “Consumer Update” to the public reporting on the results
of the Interphone Study under the headline “No Evidence Linking Cell
Phone Use to Risk of Brian Tumors.”79 For its part, the wireless industry
immediately cited the study as exonerating cell phones from any risk of
malignant brain tumors80 and included links to the FDA Consumer
Update in package inserts for their phones.81
In 2011, researchers monitored the brain activity of 47 men and
women during cell phone conversations, where cell phones were placed
on both their left and right ears.82 While the researchers did not find
altered activity throughout the entire brain, scans showed “significant
changes in the orbitofrontal cortex and temporal pole, nearest to the ear,
and the cell phone’s antennae, which are responsible for decision-making
and auditory processing.”83 However, the study concluded that “[t]his
finding is of unknown clinical significance.”84 Another 2011 study,

77

Cell Phones and Brain Tumors, 15 Reasons for Concern:Science, Spin and the
Truth Behind Interphone, EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, 1, 5 (Feb. 2000), http://archive.radiationresearch.org
/pdfs/reasons_a4.pdf; see also Ian Sample, Mobile Phone Study Finds No Solid link to
Brain Tumors, THE GUARDIAN(May 17, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com
/science/2010/may/17/mobile-phones-brain-cancer-study; Janet Raloff, Interphone Study
Finds Hints of Brain Cancer in Heavy Cell-Phone Users, SCIENCENEWS (May 17, 2010),
http://sciencenews.org?view/generic/id/59296/description/Interphone_study_finds_hints_
of_brain_cancer_risk_in_heavy_cell-phone_users.
As one Interphone researcher
summed up the study: “If you look at the overall evidence, the study did not confirm or
dismiss the possible association between cell phones and brain tumors. That’s the bottom
line.” Id. The study itself urged more research. Id.
78
Panayotopoulous, supra note 4.
79
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, NO EVIDENCE LINKING CELL PHONE USE TO
RISK OF BRAIN TUMORS, at 1 (2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers
/ConsumerUpdates/UCM212306.pdf. The GAO has criticized the FDA Report, supra
note 12, at 5, 26–27.
80
Shari Roan, Embargo Break on Cellphone Brain Tumor Study Adds to
TIMES
BLOGS,
(May
17,
2010,
10:45
AM),
Controversy,
LA
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/booster_shots/2010/05/cell-phone-interphone-braintumors.html.
81
See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 12, at 7, 26–27; Consumer Information About
Radio Frequency Emissions and Responsible Driving, VERIZON WIRELESS (June 2010),
http://support.verizonwireless.com/support/pdf/collateral/rf0610.pdf
[hereinafter
VERIZON WIRELESS]
82
Schneider, supra note 73.
83
Id.
84
Id.
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conducted in Sweden, found an increase in gliomas as the latency period
and degree of cell phone usage increased.85
B. Unique Concerns About RF Exposure Among Children
As noted above, there is particular concern about RF exposure
among children and teens, the fastest growing group of cell users in the
country.86 This growth is actively cultivated by the cell phone industry
through advertising campaigns which extoll the indispensability of these
mobile devices to their active life styles, and appealing to parents’ desire
to remain “in touch” with their children, particularly given the burdens of
their own demanding schedules.87 However, within the scientific
community there is a growing concern that, children are most at risk to
the potentially serious adverse health effects from the use of cell phones.
The current SAR standard for RF exposure from wireless devices is
based on exposure testing of an adult male head, and only for thermal
effects at that. No consideration is given to the smaller heads of either
females or children.88 This standard is flawed for several important
reasons. First, the still developing nervous system and associated brainwave activity in a child are more vulnerable to disturbances by RF
radiation than are the brain waves of a mature adult.89 Additionally, the
increased mitotic activity in the cells of developing children makes them
more susceptible to genetic damage from RF radiation.90 Finally, a
child’s immune system’s efficiency is also reduced by RF radiation.91
Children’s immune systems are generally less strong than those of
adults.92 Consequently, children will be less able to fend off any adverse
health effects provoked by chronic exposure to RF radiation.93
Underscoring the need for a new standard accommodating the
unique risks posed to children is the fact that long before WHO listed
cell phone emissions as “possibly carcinogenic to humans” in May 2011,
several governments had already imposed severe restrictions on cell

85

Panayotopoulous, supra note 4.
See supra p. 1; Herberman, supra note 16, at 7.
87
A search of the internet will reveals any number of “friends and family” plans
offered by cell phone providers.
88
See supra pp. 8–9 for the SAR standard.
89
G.J. Hyland, Environmental Impact of Electrosmog, in ELECTROMAGNETIC
ENVIRONMENTS AND HEALTH IN BUILDINGS 149, 158 (Derek Clements-Croome ed., 2003).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 159.
92
Id.
93
Id.
86

2013]

A Tale of Two Circuits

15

phone use by children.94 Those restrictions are based on the fact that
children: (1) have developing nervous systems which are likely to be
more vulnerable to potentially hazardous agents than those of mature
adults; (2) have smaller heads, thinner skulls, and higher tissue
conductivity which may mean that children can absorb more energy from
a particular phone than do adults; and (3) will inevitably use cell phones
for a longer period of their lives and therefore will tend to accumulate
greater risk to any detrimental health effects.95 Similarly, researchers at
the WHO stated in an article in the Journal of Pediatrics in August 2005
that, until more is known, pediatricians “could advise parents that their
children’s RF exposure can be reduced by restricting the length of calls
or by using hands-free devices to keep mobile phones away from the
head and body.”96
Numerous foreign governments and governmental agencies have
taken decisive steps to curb cell phone use by children, including: United
Kingdom;97 Germany,98 Denmark,99 Thailand,100 France,101 Russia,102
Italy, 103 Canada,104 and Bangladesh.105 In a statement on January 11,
2005, Sir William Stewart of the National Radiological Protection Board
in the United Kingdom urged parents not to give cell phones to children
under eight years old, and urged that those between eight and fourteen

94
Mobile Phone Health Risks: The Case for Action to Protect Children,
MOBILEWISE, 24 (Nov. 2011), http://www.mobilewise.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads
/MobileWise_mobile_phone_health_risks_NEW.pdf.
95
Id. at 16–17.
96
Leeka Kheifets et al., The Sensitivity of Children to Electromagnetic Fields, 116 J.
OF PEDIATRICS 303, 311 (2005).
97
Graeme Wearden, Government to Respond to Stewart Enquiry, ZDNET (Dec. 8,
2000),http://www.zdnet.com/government-set-to-respond-to-stewart-enquiry3002083057/.
98
Don Maisch, Children and Mobile Phones: Is There a Health Risk? The Case for
Extra Precautions, 22 J. OF AUSTRALASIAN COLLEGE OF NUTRITIONAL AND ENVTL. MED.
3, 4 (2003); German Academy of Pediatrics: Keep Kids Away from Mobiles, 21
MICROWAVE NEWS 1, 5 (2001), available at http://microwavenews.com/sites/default
/files/backissues/j-f01.ISSUE_.pdf.
99
Maisch, supra note 98, at 4.
100
Id. at 4.
101
Id. .
102
Nancy McVicar, Getting a Cell Phone for Your Child? You May Want to Call up
Research, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL (Oct. 2, 2005), http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2005-10-02/news/0510010696_1_cell-phones-joe-farren-wireless-phones.
103
Id.
104
Mobile Phone Health Risks: The Case for Action to Protect Children,
MOBILEWISE, 24 (Nov. 2011), http://www.mobilewise.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads
/MobileWise_mobile_phone_health_risks_NEW.pdf.
105
Maisch, supra note 98, at 4.
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should use them only when absolutely necessary.106 Professor Stewart
further stated that there was enough uncertainty about possible health
risks from mobile phones to adopt a cautionary approach, particularly
with children, and that new research being carried out across Europe led
him to become “more concerned” about health risks than five years
earlier.107
Finally, Stewart called for more stringent disclosure
requirements regarding how much radiation is absorbed in the body from
different mobile phones.108
Closer to home, Nicholas Johnson, a former member of the FCC,
signed a petition and sent a letter to members of Congress in 2005 asking
them to investigate the marketing of cell phones to children by the
wireless industry.109 Five years earlier, on April 27, 2000, Norbert
Hankin, an environmental scientist at the EPA’s Office of Radiation and
Indoor Air, wrote in an e-mail to Dr. George Carlo, who had conducted a
study of cell phone safety for the wireless industry:
Recent studies involving short-term exposures have demonstrated
that the subtle effects on brain functions can be produced by lowintensity pulse modulated [RF] radiation. Some research
involving rodents has shown adverse effects on short-term and
long-term memory. The concern is that if such effects may occur
in young children, then even slight impairment of learning ability
over years of education may negatively affect the quality of life
that could be achieved by these individuals, when adults. The
potential effect on learning of exposure from telecommunication
devices used by children should be considered for study by the
Radiation Protection Project.110

Studies have shown that a call of just two minutes can continue to
affect the electrical activity in a child’s brain for up to an hour after
use.111 The same study showed that a child’s use of a cell phone results
in radiation penetrating deeply into a child’s brain.112 Disturbed brain
106

David Adams, Expert Spells It Out: Health Fears Mean Young Should Not Use
Mobile Phones, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2005), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society
/2005/jan/12/health.medicineandhealth1.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Nancy McVicar, Officials at Odds over the Long-Term Effects of Cell Phone Use,
SUN SENTINEL, 3 (Oct. 2, 2005), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2005-10-02/news
/0510010696_1_cell-phones-joe-farren-wireless-phones.
110
CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 219; see infra pp. 32–33.
111
What Cell Phones Can Do to Youngster’s Brain In 2 Minutes, U.K. SUNDAY
MIRROR (Apr. 1, 2004), http://rense.com/general51/two.htm.
112
Id.
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activity can lead to psychiatric or behavioral problems and may also
cause learning difficulties in children.113
Another study showed that RF emissions could cause memory loss
and epilepsy in young users.114 The study found that non-thermal
radiation from the emissions changed the structure of human cells and
that children were particularly vulnerable because their skulls were
smaller and thinner, making it easier for radiation to penetrate.115 More
recently, researchers at the Yale School of Medicine found that pregnant
mice exposed to radiation from a cell phone affected brain development
of the offspring, leading to hyperactivity, impaired memory and other
behavioral problems after birth.116 The researchers’ goal was to
determine whether there was a possible correlation between cell phone
use and the growth in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”)
in children by examining whether mice exposed to RF radiation in utero
exhibited similar behavior characteristics of children with ADHD.117
The researchers performed behavioral and electrophysiological studies
and conducted a battery of tests that identify impairments in memory,
hyperactivity, anxiety, and fear—conditions often associated with
ADHD—and found such a relationship.118 The researchers warned,
however, that “[further experiments are needed in humans and nonhuman primates to determine the risk of [RF] exposure during
pregnancy.”119
IV. THE WIRELESS INDUSTRY’S RESPONSE
Responding to growing concerns about the safety of their devices,
some members of the wireless industry began to insert a copy of or link
to the FDA’s October 1999 “Consumer Update on Mobile Phones”
(“FDA Update”) into their product packaging.120 The FDA Update
began by informing consumers:
113

Id.
G.J. Hyland, How Exposure to Base-Station Radiation Can Adversely Affect
Humans, COUNCIL ON WIRELESS TECH. IMPACTS (Dec. 2000), http://www.wirelessimpacts
.org/science/hyland1202.html.
115
Id.
116
See Tamir S. Aldad et al., Fetal Radiofrequency Radiation Exposure From 800–
1900 MHz Rated Cellular Telephones Affects Neurodevelopment and Behavior in Mice, 2
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 1 (2012), http://www.nature.com/srep/2012/120315/srep00312
/pdf/srep00312.pdf.
117
Id. at 1–2.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 1.
120
See GAO Report, supra note 12, at 5, 26–27.
114
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Mobile phones emit low levels of radio frequency energy (i.e.,
radio frequency radiation) in the microwave range while being
used. They also emit very low levels of [RF] energy, considered
non-significant, when in the stand-by mode. It is well known
that high levels of RF can produce biological damage through
heating effects (this is how your microwave oven is able to cook
food).
However, it is not known whether, to what extent, or through
what mechanism, lower levels of RF might cause adverse health
effects as well. Although some research has been done to
address these questions, no clear picture of the biological effects
of this type of radiation has emerged to date. Thus, the available
science does not allow us to conclude that mobile phones are
absolutely safe, or that they are unsafe.121

Relying on the conflicting results of the numerous studies investigating
the potential health hazards from cell-phone usage, the FDA Update
went on to state, “there is not enough evidence to know for sure, either
way.”122
While acknowledging its refusal to take concrete action in
regulating RF radiation from mobile devices, the FDA sought to assuage
consumers by emphasizing that it “has urged the mobile phone industry
to take a number of steps to ensure public safety.”123 These steps
included recommendations that the mobile industry:
- support needed research into possible biological effects of RF
of the type emitted by mobile phones;
- design mobile phones in a way that minimizes any RF exposure
to the user that is not necessary for device function; and
- cooperate in providing mobile phone users with the best
possible information on what is known about possible effects of
mobile phone use on human health.124

In addition to furnishing this FDA Update as a package insert or website
reference, some members of the wireless industry also began including
121
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, The U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s
Center for Devices and Radiological Health Consumer Update on Mobile Phones, Oct.
20, 1999, http://cryptome.org/fda102099.htm (emphasis added).
122
Id. The Update went further in citing the alleged methodological flaws in “many”
studies as support for its inconclusive stance on potential health hazards. See id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
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headsets as part of the package of newly purchased mobile phones, and
headsets had been marketed as a separate accessory for years.
In a similar vein, during a widely publicized press conference on
January 25, 1993, Motorola, a major cellular manufacturer, proclaimed
that “thousands of studies” had shown that cellular phones were
“safe.”125 On July 16, 1993, in furtherance of its campaign to assure the
consumers of the “safety” of cell phones, the industry’s trade association,
the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (“CTIA”), held a
press conference to release a report entitled “Safety Update-Fast Facts:
Portable Cell Phone Safety”126 The report stated unequivocally, in bold
print; “Rest assured. Cellular telephones are safe!”127 The report further
stated that the emissions from cell phones fell within the safety standards
of the FCC.128
These widely disseminated industry pronouncements prompted the
Deputy Director for Science at the Center for Devices and Radiological
Health of the FDA to send a letter to the CTIA three days later. The letter
directly challenged the statements made by the industry regarding the
“safety” of cell phones.129 The FDA’s letter to CTIA stated, in pertinent
part:
I am writing to let you know that we were concerned about two
important aspects of your press conference on July 16 concerning
the safety of cellular phones, and to ask that you carefully
consider the following comments when you make future
statements to the press.
First, both the written press statements and your verbal comments
during the conference seemed to display an unwarranted
confidence that these products will be found to be absolutely
safe. In fact, the unremittingly upbeat tone of the press packet
strongly implies that there can be no hazard, leading the reader to
wonder why any further research would be needed at all. (Some
readers might also wonder how impartial the research can be
when its stated goal is “a determination to reassure consumers,”
and when the research sponsors predict in advance that “we
125

Jeffrey Hoffman, Motorola Defends Cellular Industry Over Cancer Charges,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 25, 1993), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1993/MotorolaDefends-Cellular-Industry-over-Cancer-Charges/id-4a48a34f107d8c259ad81ea3a48e
1ee4.
126
CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 38.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 38–39,
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expect the new research to reach the same conclusion, that the
cellular phones are safe.”).130

The letter went on to declare:
We are even more concerned that your press statements did not
accurately characterize the relationship between CTIA and the
FDA . . . since it is not yet clear whether we will help to direct
the research program, it is premature to state that we will
credential the research.
To sum up . . . our role as a public health agency is to protect
health and safety, not to “reassure consumers.” I think it is very
important that the public understand where we stand in
evaluating the possibility that cellular phones might pose a health
risk . . . .131

On January 29, 1993, CTIA announced that cellular
communications industry . . . will fund research to re-validate the
findings of the existing studies, which have found that the radio waves
from cellular phones are safe.”132 CTIA, with input and assistance from
the Telecommunications Industry Association (“TIA”), hired Dr. George
Carlo (“Carlo”), an epidemiologist, to chair what was dubbed the
Surveillance Program to conduct the research through an entity called
Wireless Technology Research (“WTR”),133 However, CTIA and TIA
let funding to WTR lapse, thereby terminating the project without any
conclusions about any potential health risks from cell phone emissions.134
Later that same year, the cell phone industry, again through its trade
association CTIA, organized a committee to prepare a manual for public
dissemination discussing “responsible” cell phone use.135 The draft
manual included language that acknowledged, or at least implied, that the
use of cell phones could pose health risks.136 The committee thereafter
deleted the offending material, set forth in brackets below:
130

Id. at 39.
Id. at 40.
132
CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at at 9. The primary motivation for initiating the
research, according to CTIA, was so that “truth and good science [would] replace
emotional videotape and unsupported allegations.” Id.
133
Id. at 9–10.
134
Id. at 138–39. The Federal GAO labeled the study “controversial” because of the
lack of transparency about its work and finances, the direction of its research agenda, its
disregard of input from the FDA, and other criticisms. See GAO Report, supra note 12,
at 15–17.
135
CARLO & SCHRAM, supra note 33, at 48.
136
Id. at 49,
131
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“Do not operate your transportable cellular telephone when holding
the antenna, or when any person is within 4 inches (10 centimeters) of
the antenna. [Otherwise you may impair call quality, may cause your
phone to operate at a higher power level than is necessary, and may
expose that person to RF energy in excess of the levels established by the
updated ANSI Standard.
If you want to limit RF exposure even further, you may choose to
control the duration of your calls or maintain a distances from the
antenna of more than 4 inches (10 centimeters)].
For best call quality, keep the antenna free from obstructions and
point it straight up.”137
CTIA and the TIA elected not to make the disclosures and warnings
proposed by their own committee.138
While consistent and adamant about the “safety” of cells phones,
members of the wireless industry obtained patents in 1998 on radiation
shielding devices for mobile phones, citing increased concerns about
exposure of the brain and other organs to emissions that “in the worst
case it has been suggested could [lead] to a development of malignant
tumor e.g. glioma from supportive cells.”139 Separately, independent
companies have capitalized on fears about the potentially
harmful
health effects of RF radiation from cell phones, marketing aftermarket
“shields” which are advertised to block any harmful emissions.140
Meanwhile, the FDA has been anything but consistent in its
statements–both internally and to the public at large—about the possible
health risks of RF emissions from cell phones. In the Spring of 1993, at
the height of public concern over a possible link between cell phones use
and brain cancer, biologists at the FDA concluded in an internal
memorandum that the available data “strongly suggests” that microwave
137
Id. at 49. Virtually all antennae on recent model cell phones are built internally in
the device, so there is no ability to control its direction. See FAQs, supra note 7
(“[W]ireless phones are hand held phones with built-in antennas”).
138
Id. at 51.
139
U.S. Patent No. 5,787,340 (filed Feb. 15, 1994); see also U.S. Patent No.
5,550,552 (filed Feb. 15, 1994); U.S. Patent No. 5,338,896 (filed Sept. 3, 1993); Myranda
Mowafi, Plans for “Cancer Shields” in Mobile Phones, DAILY MAIL, http://www
.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-52390/plans-cancers-shields-mobile-phones.html;
see
generally Elissa Batista, Patents Prove Cell Phone Dangers?(Feb. 22, 2002),
http://cellphoneradiationprotection.com/reports11.html.
140
See Chris Woolston, Do Cell Phone Shields Block Radiation?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE
(Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.chicagotribune.com/health/chi-tc-health-skeptic-celldonejun26,0,1956147.story; see also THE EMF SAFETY SHOP, http://www.lessemf.com
(last visited Sept. 6, 2013); PRESS SHIELD, http://www.pressshield.com (last visited Sept.
6, 2013); SAR Shield, http://sarshield.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
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emissions, apart from their thermal heating effects, can “accelerate the
development of cancer.”141 According to researchers at the FDA’s
Center for Devices and Radiological Health: “[o]f approximately eight
chronic animal experiments known to us, five resulted in increased
numbers of malignancies, accelerated progression of tumors, or both.”142
But the FDA’s public statements from 1993 through the remainder of the
decade were consistent with its 1999 Update, and professed an inability
to reach any firm conclusions about potential adverse health effects of
RF radiation at levels emitted by cell phones given the inconclusive and
often conflicting medical research and studies on the subject.143
Currently, the FDA and FCC websites are even more bullish about
the safety of cell phones. While also acknowledging that the “research is
ongoing” and that “additional research is warranted to address gaps in
knowledge, such as the effects of cell phone use over the long-term and
on pediatric populations,” the FDA’s website tells the public that the
“weight of scientific evidence does not show any association between
exposure to radiofrequency from cell phones and adverse health
outcomes.”144 The website downplays the WHO’s May 11, 2011
classification of RF radiation as “possibly carcinogenic to humans” by
noting that both coffee and “talc-based body powder” fall into that same
classification Group 2B.145 As noted previously, the FDA also
misleadingly promotes the Interphone Study in a Consumer Update
under the headline “No Evidence Linking Cell Phone Use to Risk of
Brain Tumors” when the study itself explicitly disavows any such
sweeping conclusion146 and, to the contrary, expressly acknowledges a
potentially higher risk of malignant brain cancer from heavy cell phone
use.147 The FDA also weighs in on children, stating unequivocally that
141

1993 FDA Memo: Data “Strongly Suggest” Microwaves Can Promote Cancer, 23
MICROWAVE NEWS 1, 5 (2001), available at http://microwavenews.com/sites
/default/files/sites/default/files/backissues/j-f03issue.pdf [hereinafter 1993 FDA Memo].
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Radiation-Emitting
Products,
Current
Research
Results,
FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,
http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/
RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/HomeBusinessandEntertainment/Cellphones/u
cm116335.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Radiation-Emitting Products].
145
Id. Lead, engine exhaust and chloroform also fall within Group 2B. AEGISGUARD
RADIATION SHIELDS – THE NECESSARY ACCESSORY, http://www.goaegis.com/wireless_
controversy.html, (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
146
See supra pp. 20–22.
147
See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, NO EVIDENCE LINKING CELL PHONE
USE TO RISK OF BRAIN TUMORS, at 1 (2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads
/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM212306.pdf.
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“[t]he scientific evidence does not show a danger to any users of cell
phones from RF exposure, including children and teenagers,” dismissing
the December 2005 Stewart Report as “strictly precautionary” and “not
based on scientific evidence that any health hazard exists.”148 Such a
ringing endorsement of the purported safety of mobile phone usage
seems, at best, inconsistent with the FDA’s prior disavowal of any presale or even primary regulatory authority.149
For its part, the FCC’s website is equally dismissive, stating flat out
that any cell phone that meets its SAR level of 1.6 W/kg is “safe,”150 and
repeating its prior statement that “[t]here is no scientific evidence that
proves that wireless telephone usage can lead to cancer or other
problems, including headaches, dizziness or memory loss.”151 However,
the FCC similarly states that the federal government is monitoring the
results of new studies “investigating claims of possible health effects
related to the use of wireless telephones,” and notes that “the FDA is
participating in an industry-funded research project to further investigate
possible biological effects.”152 For additional information, the FCC
directs readers to, among other sources, the industry trade association’s
own website.153 As before, cell phone manufacturers include links to the
FCC and FDA websites—and sometimes quote verbatim these official
statements—on their package inserts.154
Despite the FDA and FCC’s tepid action regarding the potential
health hazards of cell phone use, not all governmental watchdogs have
been so bashful about raising public awareness on the issue. The
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), an agency familiar with the
unsettled issues surrounding RF emissions and the guidelines adopted by
the FCC, acknowledged publicly that “[f]ederal health and safety
148

Radiation-Emitting Products, supra note 144.
Compare id. where the agency’s website states that the FDA is a member of a
federal “Interagency Working Group” which coordinates “different aspects of RF safety,”
and that it “shares regulatory responsibilities for cell phones” with the FCC, with supra
notes 123–124 and accompanying text.
150
SAR for Cellular Phones, supra note 49; FAQs, supra note 7.
151
FAQs, supra note 7. The Federal GAO has expressed its concern to the FCC that
this public statement is “misleading, because it implies that the health issues are settled”
when they are not. See GAO Report, supra note 12, at 30.
152
FAQs, supra note 7.
153
SAR for Cellular Phones, supra note 49.
154
See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 12, at 5, 26–30; VERIZON WIRELESS, supra note
81. The GAO is particularly critical of the manufacturers’ use of these federal agency
statements, noting that the Consumer Update and other comments by the FDA are “not
designed for mass distribution as an insert in mobile phone packaging.” GAO Report,
supra note 12, at 27.
149
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guidelines have not yet developed policies concerning possible risk from
long-term, non-thermal exposures.”155 The agency also stated that “[t]he
FCC’s exposure guideline is considered protective of effects arising from
a thermal mechanism but not from all possible mechanisms,”
emphasizing that “the generalization by many that the guidelines protect
human beings from harm by any or all mechanisms is not justified.”156
Confirming that “[m]ost people’s greatest exposures result from the use
of personal communications devices that expose the head,” the EPA
concluded that “the current exposure guidelines used by the FCC are
based on the effects resulting from whole-body heating, not exposure of
and effect on critical organs including the brain and the eyes.”157
V. THE FCC FORMALLY WEIGHS IN
In 1985, the FCC for the first time issued guidelines regarding
human exposure to RF radiation from certain FCC-regulated facilities.158
Significantly, the FCC action was taken under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”),159 rather than any grant of
authority by Congress to the FCC based on that agency’s expertise or
field of specialty.160 Under NEPA, all federal agencies, including the
FCC, are required to assess the environmental impact of any proposed
“major” actions that might have a “significant” effect on the human
environment.161
155

Letter from Norbert Hankin, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to Janet
Newton President, The EMR Network (July 16, 2002), available at
http://www.emrpolicy.org/litigation/case_law/docs/noi_epa_response.pdf
156
Id.
157
Id.; see also GAO Report, supra note 12, at 20–21.
158
See Responsibility of the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n to Consider Biological Effects
of Radiofrequency Radiation When Authorizing the Use of Radiofrequency Devices.
Potential Effects of A Reduction in the Allowable Level of Radiofrequency Radiation on
FCC Authorized Commc’ns Servs. & Equip., 100 F.C.C.2d 543 (1985) (report and order)
[hereinafter Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and Order]. The
FCC has regulatory jurisdiction over wireless telephone service as part of its authority
over radio transmissions. The FCC regulates the spectrum available for cell phone use
and sets technical standards associated with cell phone communication. Because cell
phones transmit radio signals, FCC authorization is required before a particular cellphone model may be sold or used in the United States. 47 C.F.R. § 2.803 (2013).
159
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2013).
160
See Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and Order, 100
F.C.C.2d at 543–44, 546.
161
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(ii). NEPA requires all agencies to consider the environmental impact of their proposed actions and to take procedural steps, including
preparation of environmental assessments (“EAs”) or environmental impact statements
(“EISs”), before taking any “major” action that may “significantly affect[] the quality of
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In its 1982 notice of proposed rulemaking, the FCC specifically
acknowledged that it lacked primary jurisdiction to promulgate health
and safety standards for RF radiation.162 Nevertheless, the FCC explained
that NEPA required it to consider whether the activities at facilities and
physical plants that it licenses significantly affected the environment.163
For this reason, the FCC proposed amending its rules to address RF
radiation at certain facilities.164 The FCC did not seek to impose any
substantive requirements on its regulated industries, nor could it have
done so under the purely procedural parameters of NEPA.165 The FCC
also noted that state and local authorities already had adopted regulations
regarding human exposure to RF radiation, but did not indicate any
concern about possible conflict between those regulations and the FCC
standards for transmission facilities.166
In 1985, the FCC finalized its proposal by amending the
regulations. The amendments specified certain actions that would be
categorically excluded from NEPA’s environmental analysis requirement
because they lack significant effect.167 The FCC stated that applications
for certain permits would trigger NEPA requirements if the facilities
seeking the permits are not in compliance with the otherwise voluntary,
the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). NEPA does not confer special
authority on the FCC or on any other federal agency. NEPA merely imposes obligations
on all federal agencies to consider the environmental impact of their proposed “major”
actions. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2). NEPA imposes only procedural obligations. Dept. of
Trans. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004). “NEPA itself does not mandate
particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.” Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989). In Robertson the Court mandated
that “[b]ecause NEPA imposes no substantive requirement that mitigation measures
actually be taken, it should not be read to require agencies to obtain an assurance that
third parties will implement particular measures.” Id. at 353 n.16.
162
Responsibility of the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n to Consider Biological Effects of
Radiofrequency Radiation When Authorizing the Use of Radiofrequency Devices.
Potential Effects of A Reduction in the Allowable Level of Radiofrequency Radiation on
FCC Authorized Commc’ns Servs. & Equip., 89 F.C.C.2d 214, 251 (1982) (notice of
proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation
Notice].
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 253.
166
Id.
167
See Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and Order, 100
F.C.C.2d 543 (1985). Established by NEPA, the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) coordinates federal environmental efforts and has issued NEPA regulations “to
tell federal agencies what they must do to comply with the procedures and achieve the
goals of the Act.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2013). CEQ has instructed agencies that they
may identify categories of actions that are excluded from NEPA because such actions
typically would not trigger an EA or EIS requirement. Id. §§ 1507.3(b), 1508.4.
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privately promulgated health and safety guidelines for RF radiation
established by the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) in
1982.168 As in its 1982 proposal, the FCC again explicitly acknowledged
that it had “neither the expertise nor the authority to develop its own
health and safety standards.”169 The FCC’s 1985 standard was also
severely limited in scope. Many low-power devices, including cell
phones, were categorically excluded from the NEPA-based guidelines.170
The FCC regulations implementing NEPA applied only to radio and
television broadcast stations, earth stations and other “brick and mortar”
facilities.171 All other FCC-licensed facilities and systems, including
“cellular” facilities, were categorically excluded from FCC regulation of
exposure to RF radiation.172
In 1992, ANSI adopted new guidelines for permissible RF radiation
exposure that applied to additional categories, including cell phones.173
The FCC then proposed updating its NEPA regulations to reflect ANSI’s
new findings.174 Because the 1992 ANSI guidelines addressed cell
phones, the FCC’s proposal suggested incorporating cell phones within
its regulatory prerogative.175
While the FCC rulemaking was underway, Congress enacted the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“TCA”),176 which amended the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 (“FCA”). The TCA did not
authorize the FCC to issue substantive health or safety regulations
addressing RF emissions, but nevertheless directed the FCC to complete
the NEPA rulemaking within 180 days.177 Section 704(a) gave
preemptive effect to the RF emission regulations that the FCC was
directed to prescribe under Section 704(b), but only to the extent
explicitly stated in 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) governing wireless
168

Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d at
543–44.
169
Id. at 560.
170
Id. at 563.
171
Id. at 561–63, 567.
172
Id. at 559, 563; see Responsibility of the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n to Consider
Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation When Authorizing the Use of
Radiofrequency Devices. Potential Effects of A Reduction in the Allowable Level of
Radiofrequency Radiation on FCC Authorized Commc’ns Servs. & Equip., 2 F.C.C. Rcd.
2064, 2065–66 (1987) (second report and order).
173
See Guidelines for Evaluating the Environmental “Effects” of Radiofrequency
Radiation, 8 F.C.C. Rcd. 2849, 2850 (1993) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
174
Id. at 2851.
175
Id.
176
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
177
Id. § 704(b).
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service “facilities.”178 Prior to the passage of the TCA, many state and
local authorities had adopted ordinances that restricted the number and
location of wireless stations and transmission lines due to concerns over
RF radiation emissions. The FCC was powerless to interfere with this
local action, and nothing in either NEPA itself or the FCC’s NEPA-based
RF radiation regulations gave the agency any preemptive authority over
those facilities and transmission lines. The TCA changed that and gave
the FCC the specific authority it needed to preempt state and local law
that conflicted with its own RF radiation regulations governing the size
and location of those facilities.179 But the FCA contained two additional
provisions that severely restricted the extent to which Congress allowed
FCC regulation of RF radiation to be given preemptive effect. Even
before the TCA, the FCA contained a “savings” provision that remained
in effect and states: “Nothing in this chapter [] shall in any way abridge
or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.”180 The third
explicit TCA mandate unambiguously rejected any “implied preemption”
of state or local law. More particularly, Section 601(c)(1) of the TCA
expressly states, under the heading “EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS”:
(c) FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW—
(1)No Implied Effect—This Act and the amendments
made by this Act shall not be construed to modify,
impair or supercede Federal, State or local law unless
expressly so provided in such Act or amendments.181

The plain meaning of this statutory language requires no interpretation.,
although any doubt as to Congress’s intent is easily eliminated by
consulting the legislative history of Section 601(c)(1): “The conference
agreement adopts the House provision stating that the bill does not have
any effect on any Federal, State or local law unless the bill expressly so
provides. This provision prevents affected parties from asserting that the
bill impliedly preempts other laws.”182 If “conflict” preemption bars
178

Id. § 704(a).
See Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation, 12
F.C.C. Rcd. 13,494, 13,542 (1997) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
180
47 U.S.C. § 414 (1934).
181
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(c)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2006);
see also 47 U.S.C. § 414. In the original statute, “this chapter” was “this Act.”
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (repealed
and amended 1996). The chapter includes all of the FCA and subsequent amendments.
182
H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 201 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
US.C.C.A.N. 10 (emphasis added). Thus, Section 601(c)(1) of the TCA “specifically
179
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application of a state law that would “stand[] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of
Congress,”183 it is difficult to understand the application of that doctrine
when Congress itself has explicitly stated that particular federal statutes
should have no such “implied” preemptive effect.
After passage of the TCA, and in accordance with the TCA’s
requirement that the FCC conclude its RF rulemaking within 180 days,
the FCC adopted new standards, which it expressly referred to as
“guidelines,” addressing RF radiation emitted by its regulated facilities
and cell phones on August 1, 1996. Under the new regulations, the FCC
may approve licensing and authorization applications from facilities that
emit less than a specified amount of RF radiation without undertaking
any environmental analysis under NEPA.184 In addition to facilities, the
1996 regulations, for the first time, also covered “portable devices” such
as cell phones.185 However, as with its prior promulgations, the
regulation of portable devices was attributed to the FCC’s
“responsibilities under [NEPA] to evaluate the environmental
significance of its actions,” rather than the delegation of any authority
under the TCA or under any other telecommunications statute.186 The
FCC also adopted a regulation limiting preemption patterned on Section
332(c)(7)(B)(iv) and incorporated verbatim its restrictive preemptive
language.187
It bears repeating that the FCC issued its 1996 guidelines to satisfy
its “responsibilities under [NEPA] to evaluate the environmental
provides that the amendments shall not impliedly preempt state or local law.” City of
Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1999). Accord AT&T Commc’ns of the Pac.
Nw., Inc. v. City of Eugene, 35 P.3d 1029 (Or. 2001).
There are two types of “implied” preemption: field preemption, and conflict preemption.
“Field” preemption applies when Congress’s “intent to pre-empt all state law in a
particular area may be inferred [because] the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive” or “the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Colacicco v.
Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Hillsboro County v. Automated
Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)). “Conflict” preemption applies when “‘state
law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law,’ even though
Congress has not displaced all law in a given area.” Id. In most “conflict” preemption
cases, the relevant inquiry is whether “state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress.”
Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 266 (quoting Hillsboro, 471 U.S. at 713).
183
See supra note 182.
184
See Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation, 11
F.C.C. Rcd. 15,123, 15,179 (1996) (report and order).
185
See id.
186
See 47 C.F.R. § 2.1093(c) (2013) (emphasis added).
187
See 47 C.F.R. § 1.1307(e) (2013).
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significance of its actions.”188 Accordingly, if an application for equipment authorization from a cell phone manufacturer shows that the phones
emit more than the specified amount of RF radiation, FCC regulations
require the completion of an environmental analysis, in the form of an
EIS or similar study, to satisfy NEPA before the application can be
considered.
Notably, while the FCC has addressed RF emissions from cell
phones to meet its obligations under NEPA and the FCA provisions
expressly disavowing any implied preemptive effect, Congress has
conferred authority upon another agency to issue preemptive radiation
standards for consumer products. Specifically, under the Radiation
Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968, Congress directed the FDA to
“prescribe performance standards for electronic products to control the
emission of electronic product radiation from such products if [the FDA]
determines that such standards are necessary for the protection of the
public health and safety.”189 If the FDA issues regulations prescribing
such health and safety standards, those regulations preempt conflicting
state and local law.190 Indeed, the cell phone industry, seeking to thwart
a consumer class action in federal court in Louisiana under the doctrine
of preemption, invoked the FDA’s exclusive authority under the
Radiation Act as grounds for dismissal, asserting, “[p]reemption exists
under the ‘complex regulatory scheme’ governing RFR emissions
created by the Electronic Product Radiation Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360hh360ss.”191 Even after the adoption of its new RF radiation guidelines, the
FCC continued to affirmatively disclaim any responsibility for assessing
the health and safety effects of wireless telephones. For example, in his
April 12, 2001 letter to the GAO addressing the newly released GAO
Telecommunications Report, the Managing Director of the FCC
emphatically reaffirmed that the agency has no regulatory oversight on
matters pertaining to health and safety involving cell phones or any other
consumer device, stating, “I reiterate, as the Report notes elsewhere, the

188
47 C.F.R. § 2.1093(a) (addressing RF radiation evaluation for cell phones); see 11
F.C.C. Rcd. at 15,125 (the guidelines were issued to satisfy NEPA and “the requirements
of the [TCA] for a timely resolution of this proceeding”).
189
21 U.S.C. § 360kk(a)(1) (2013).
190
Id. § 360ss.
191
Motorola Inc.’s Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and supporting
Memorandum of Law, at 1–2, 5–8, Naquin v. Nokia Mobile Phones, Inc., No. 00-2023,
2000 WL 33593205 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2000); see also Motorola Inc.’s Supplemental Rule
12(c) Brief, at 2, 9, Naquin, 2000 WL 33593205.
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FCC has neither primary jurisdiction nor expertise in health and safety
matters.”192
The FCC has itself recognized numerous organizations as having
primary responsibility for the development of health and safety
guidelines regarding RF radiation emissions in cell phones, including:
the FDA, the EPA and even such non-governmental “national and
international health agencies and organizations” as the WHO.193 The
FDA and FCC websites also repeatedly advised of ways to mitigate
exposure to potentially dangerous RF emissions. For example, the sites
informed consumers that “[i]f you must conduct extended conversations
by wireless phone every day, you could place more distance between
your body and the source of RF [radiation], since exposure level drops
off dramatically with distance,” while also recommending the use of a
headset to provide added distance between the phone and the body,194
This erratic regulatory history set the stage for equally inconsistent
judicial decisions that followed.
VI. STATE LAW CONSUMER LITIGATION RELATED TO RF EMISSIONS
Amidst the scientific and medical debate and against this
inconsistent regulatory backdrop, consumers began filing lawsuits
against the cell phone industry. One such case, Farina v. Nokia, Inc,195
was a class action on behalf of Pennsylvania consumers, alleging claims
for breach of warranty and other causes of action against manufacturers
and sellers of cell phones.196 Farina’s claim was simple: the cell phone
industry had repeatedly, and consistently, promoted their cell phones as
being totally “safe.”197 Under Pennsylvania state warranty law, the
burden was on the industry to prove their assurances of “safety,” not on
Farina to demonstrate any causal connection to cancer or other adverse
192

GAO Report, supra note 12, at 34. The FCC went on to note that the FCC’s
guidelines on RF exposure based on recommendations made by private “standards-setting
organizations” such ANSI and were adopted following “consultation” with other federal
health and safety agencies without the formal rulemaking process required of those
agencies. Id.
193
See Cleveland & Ulcek, supra note 12, at 16 (“[T]he FCC’s primary jurisdiction
does not lie in the health and safety area”). It is of no small interest that the FCC also
specifically observed that “much of the non-military research on biological effects of RF
energy in the U.S. is being funded by industry organizations . . . .” Id. at 9.
194
FAQs, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
195
578 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d sub nom. 625 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 365 (2011).
196
See id.
197
Id. at 747.
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health effects.198 The Complaint sought common law and statutory
damages as well as injunctive relief, including requiring that corrective
notices be sent to former purchasers and the public at large warning that
the manufacturers’ unqualified representations of “safety” were not
supported by the scientific evidence.199 Farina also sought a requirement
that a protective headset, which already was being sold by cell phone
manufacturers as a separate add-on accessory be furnished with each cell
phone .200
Shortly after Farina was filed in state court, the case was removed
to federal court on the basis of “complete preemption” and subsequently
transferred to the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland as part of multi-district litigation (“MDL”) proceedings
there.201 Farina, along with several other MDL plaintiffs, moved for
remand based on lack of federal jurisdiction.202 The Maryland MDL
Transferee Court denied that motion and dismissed all of the cases in the
MDL on the basis of preemption.203 On appeal the Fourth Circuit
reversed.204
In finding no preemptive effect, the Fourth Circuit first noted that
the FCC’s RF radiation standard for cell phones was not promulgated
pursuant to a substantive mandate found in the TCA but under NEPA.205
Second, the court considered the TCA’s preemption provision,206 and
found that the statute’s “specificity” as to the preemptive scope of the
FCC’s RF radiation standards for wireless service facilities “weighs
against a finding that Congress has an implicit goal of making
preemptive the RF radiation standards for all other types of wireless tele-

198

See 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201.
Farina, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
200
Id. at 748. The FDA and FCC had themselves stated that protective headsets
would mitigate RF exposure. See id.
201
Id. The “complete preemption” doctrine is an exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule. Under the doctrine, “when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law
cause of action through complete pre-emption,” the state-law claim is removable because
“[w]hen the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim
[that] comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state
law, is in reality based on federal law.” Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8
(2003).
202
See Farina, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
203
See In re Wireless Tel. Radio Frequency Emissions Products Liab. Lit., 216 F.
Supp. 2d 474 (D. Md. 2002), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402
F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2005).
204
Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 998 (2005).
205
Id. at 457.
206
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (1996).
199
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communications equipment, including wireless telephones.”207 Third,
looking to the statute’s savings clause208 and the express “No Implied
Effect” provision,209 the Fourth Circuit recognized that these clauses
“counsel against any broad construction of the goals of [the relevant
statutory provisions] that would create an implicit conflict with state tort
law.”210 For all these reasons, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the statelaw claims did not conflict with the purposes and objectives of Congress
and the FCC.211
Having determined that the plaintiffs’ claims posed no conflict with
Congress’s objectives, the court next considered whether the specific
relief sought— provision of headsets—would “stand as an obstacle to
Congress’ actual goal of establishing a nationwide network of wireless
telephone service coverage.”212 The court determined that it would
not.213 Therefore, the court held, the motion to remand the removed
cases should have been granted by the district court because the federal
courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged
by Farina and the other plaintiffs.214
The Fourth Circuit in Pinney thus squarely rejected the applicability
of the preemption doctrine to the cases in the MDL proceeding to which
Farina was a party. Because one of the MDL cases, Naquin v. Nokia,
Inc., was in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the Fourth
Circuit also considered whether the claims alleged were actually
preempted on the merits—that is, whether preemption was available as a
defense, as opposed to a basis for jurisdiction.215 The Fourth Circuit
similarly rejected the defendants’ express preemption and field
preemption arguments, holding that the plaintiffs’ nearly identical
consumer claims in Naquin were not impliedly preempted by the FCA,
TCA or FCC regulations.216
Remand to Pennsylvania state court did not, however, end the
Farina saga. When Farina amended his Complaint to add an additional
defendant, that triggered removal under the recently adopted Class

207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

Pinney, 402 F.3d at 458.
47 U.S.C. § 414.
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(c)(1).
Pinney, 402 F.3d at 458.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 458.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 457–59.
Id.

2013]

A Tale of Two Circuits

33

Action Fairness Act,217 so Farina once again found himself in federal
court.218 Because there was no longer any MDL proceeding for these
cases, Farina’s case remained in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.219
Back in federal district court, the cell phone defendants filed
another motion to dismiss.220 They argued, as they had in the MDL
proceedings, that Farina’s claims were expressly preempted and
impliedly preempted under both field preemption and conflict
preemption theories.221 Although it rejected the express preemption and
field preemption arguments, the district court held that the claims were
preempted through conflict preemption by the FCC’s RF radiation
guidelines.222 Relying on the FCC’s obligation under NEPA to determine the environmental impact of its actions, and despite the fact that the
FCC’s guidelines do not impose a substantive requirement on
manufacturers and sellers of cell phones, the court stated that the
allegations in the complaint “trample upon the FCC’s authority to
determine the maximum standard for RF emissions.”223 In direct
contravention to the Fourth Circuit’s holding and analysis in Pinney, the
district court held that Farina’s claims “seek to impose legal duties that
would conflict directly with federal regulatory mandates because the
Defendants could be held liable even though they indisputably complied
with the SAR maximum.” “224
The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Farina’s claims were
neither expressly preempted nor preempted under a field preemption
theory but that, notwithstanding the FCA’s savings clause and the TCA’s
explicit prohibition against implied preemption, the case posed an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the agency’s objectives and, therefore,
was impliedly preempted.225 In effect, the Third Circuit treated the
FCC’s guidelines arising solely from the exercise of its statutory
obligations under NEPA as both a floor and a ceiling on the protections
that may be provided consumers to against RF radiation.
There is no indication that Congress intended agency environmental
guidelines implementing NEPA to have the effect of superseding state
consumer protection laws. To the contrary, Congress expressly declared
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225

28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453 (2013)
Farina, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 746.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id. at 769.
Farina, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 770.
Id.
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that “cooperation with State and local governments” was part of the
continuing policy of the federal government under NEPA.226 Nor had the
FCC construed NEPA as statutory authority for preempting state and
local regulation of the environmental effects of RF radiation. Even
before it began regulating this area, the FCC itself recognized that state
and local authorities were already regulating human exposure to RF
radiation even though NEPA had been in effect for 13 years.227
Allowing the Farina case to go forward would not have somehow
upset any delicate federal balance between health concerns and
promotion of wireless service throughout the country. Stating the
obvious, the Fourth Circuit observed: “[i]t is difficult to understand how
a headset requirement . . . would affect the establishment of a nationwide
wireless service network or the availability of wireless service
coverage.”228 Indeed, as noted previously, the cell phone industry
routinely sells headsets as separate accessories for their cell phones, so
these products are already in the marketplace, do not require any
retrofitting or redesign of their phones and cannot possibly conflict with
any pervasive and exclusive regulatory scheme.
Equating federal regulation, even substantial regulation, with
preemption as the Third Circuit did in Farina is misguided. Many
industries and products are “regulated” by federal agencies but there is
no question that even extensive oversight has no inevitable preemptive
impact on state consumer laws. The United States Supreme Court
decision in Altria Group Inc. v. Good229 made this abundantly clear.
Altria involved allegations of false advertising in the sale of “light”
cigarettes, much like the warranty and related claims alleged in
Farina.230 In Altria, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
plaintiffs’ claims, brought under the Maine consumer protection statute,
were expressly and impliedly preempted by the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (the “Labeling Act”).231 The Supreme
Court reaffirmed established principles governing the preemptive
limitation of federal statutes, first reiterating the long-established
principle: “[w]hen addressing questions of express or implied preemption, we begin our analysis ‘with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States [are] not to be superceded by the Federal Act
226
227
228
229
230
231

42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2013)
See Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Notice, 89 F.C.C.2d at 253.
Pinney, 402 F.3d at 458.
555 U.S. 70 (2008).
Id.
Id. at 91; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et. seq.
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unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”232
Continuing, the Supreme Court stated that the presumption against
preemption applies with “particular force when Congress has legislated
in a field traditionally occupied by the States” such as false and deceptive
advertising—the same subject areas involved in Farina.233 Despite the
fact that the declared purpose of the Labeling Act at issue in Altria was
“to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette
labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health,”234 the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs’
claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment were not
preempted even by such a broad delegation of federal authority.235 The
consumer fraud claims in Altria, like the “duty not to deceive” claims
prevailing in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,236 merely alleged “false or
misleading statements” which were not premised on federal law and did
not offend either the Labeling Act or any regulatory authority of the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).237
The Supreme Court thus found the plaintiffs’ claims were not
“impliedly preempted” in Altria.238 Despite a long history of industry
“guidance,” formal litigation, consent orders, official letters and other
action by the FTC designed specifically to prevent misleading
advertising relating to “light” cigarettes, the plaintiffs’ consumer fraud
claims did not conflict with those parallel federal activities in a manner
which warranted implied conflict preemption. If anything, the direct
regulatory oversight in Altria far exceeded the tentative and even
expressly disavowed the FCC’s authority over health and safety issues
relating to cell phones, to say nothing of the express provisions against
preemption in the TCA.
Concurrent with the Third and Fourth Circuits’ consideration of
federal preemption of state tort claims brought against cellular
manufacturers, another piece of litigation was winding its way through
the courts. In Murray v. Motorola, Inc.,239 in which the plaintiffs alleged
consumer class action claims similar to those alleged in Farina and
Pinney, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached an entirely
232
Altria, 555 U.S. at 77 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
233
Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
234
Id. at 78.
235
Id. at 91.
236
505 U.S. 504 (1992).
237
Altria, 555 U.S. at 80–83.
238
See id. at 85–90.
239
982 A.2d 764 (D.C. 2009).
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different conclusion.240 Rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s analysis, Murray
held that “state regulation” that would “alter the balance” that the FCC
sought to achieve through its RF regulation was preempted.241 It found
that state law claims based on allegations about the adequacy of the FCC
guidelines or the safety of FCC-authorized cell phones were therefore
preempted.242 The D.C. Circuit further found that claims seeking
damages based on the non-thermal effects of cell-phone radiation were
also preempted, despite the fact that the FCC guideline does not address
non-thermal effects at all.243
Contrary to the Third Circuit’s decision in Farina, however,
Murray did allow some claims to go forward. The court held that claims
about false or misleading statements or omissions that do not depend on
proof that cell phones are unreasonably dangerous are not preempted.244
For example, Murray permitted a claim based on the allegation that
defendants falsely represented that “[r]esearch has shown that there is
absolutely no risk of harm associated with the use of cell phones” to go
forward.245 Importantly, the surviving claims in Murray directly mirror
those brought by Farina before the Third Circuit.
Thus, as the law now stands, the viability of state-law claims
arising out of the sale of cell phones—and the industry’s representations
about the safety of those devices—depends entirely on the venue in
which those suits are brought. Consumers in Maryland and other states
in the Fourth Circuit can bring claims that consumers in Pennsylvania
and other states of the Third Circuit cannot—at least not in their courts.
Consequently, consumers near the Delaware-Maryland border in
Newark, Delaware are barred entirely from bringing any consumer
claims under the TCA in their local state or federal courts, while
consumers just a few miles away in Elkton, Maryland have the full
arsenal of state law remedies for breach of warranty and other statutory
and common law claims. Further South in Washington, D.C., consumers
have a mixed bag of rights and remedies. The inconsistent availability of
these legal protections depends entirely on where the consumer brings
his or her case, although the source of those limitations is the same

240

Id. at 768,
Id. at 776.
242
Id. at 789.
243
Id. at 778–79.
244
Id. at 783.
245
Id. at 784. (Murray also held that claims based on injuries caused by phones
acquired prior to August 1996, when the FCC issued the current standard, or phones that
did not comply with the current standard, were not preempted. Id. at 781–82.).
241
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federal statute interpreted and applied dissimilarly and inconsistently by
those courts.
THE COURTS’ CONFLICTING DECISIONS EXACERBATE AN
EXISTING DISPUTE OVER WHETHER FEDERAL AGENCY REGULATIONS
MAY IMPLIEDLY PREEMPT STATE LAW EVEN WHEN THE AUTHORIZING
STATUTE EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ANY SUCH IMPLIED PREEMPTION
VII.

The FCC derives its authority from Congress, which, through the
FCA, delegated to the FCC authority to regulate communications by wire
and radio and, in the TCA, directed the FCC to complete its then-pending
regulations regarding RF emissions within 180 days. As noted above,
Congress also expressly limited the preemptive effect of those
regulations on state laws concerning the location or construction of brick
and mortar telecommunications facilities. Congress further specified that
the FCA does not “in any way abridge or alter” common-law or statutory
remedies.246 To remove any further doubt about the limits of authority
conferred on the FCC, Congress explicitly stated, in a TCA provision
carefully entitled “No Implied Effect,” that the TCA “shall not be
construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law
unless expressly so provided.”247 Although the Supreme Court has held
that a general savings clause such as Section 414 of the FCA does not bar
the application of conflict preemption,248 it has never addressed the effect
of a statutory provision that explicitly disclaims any implied preemptive
effect.
These cases raise that important question of whether the objectives
of an agency regulation may preempt state law where the statute
authorizing or requiring the agency to act explicitly states that it has no
implied preemptive effect. Put simply, may a court find implied
preemption on the basis of “frustration of purposes” of a regulation
promulgated pursuant to a statute that Congress has stated does not
impliedly preempt state law? On this question, the courts are in conflict.
First, courts have treated the “No Implied Effect” clause of
Section 601(c)(1)—in strikingly dissimilar ways. The Fourth Circuit in
Pinney held that the clause showed that Congress did not intend RF
radiation standards for cell phones to be preemptive.249 In direct conflict,
246

47 U.S.C. § 414 (1934).
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(c)(1).
248
See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
249
See Pinney, 402 F.3d at 458. Likewise, the Seventh Circuit has held that
Section 601(c)(1) “precludes a reading that ousts the state [law] by implication.” AT&T
247
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the Third Circuit, while acknowledging that “it is conceivable that
§ 601(c)(1) could be dispositive,” held that Congress’s express disavowal
of implied preemption was, in essence, ineffective because “a savings
provision does not ‘bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption
principles.’”250 The Third Circuit thus construed the “No Implied Effect”
provision to mean only that “Congress’s objectives are more limited than
they might otherwise be characterized.”251 The court did not explain how
its holding represented merely a “more limited” reading or how its
reading was consistent with Section 601(c)(1). Similarly, in a footnote in
Murray, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals casually dismissed
Section 601(c)(1) and Pinney’s reliance on it.252
The question presented by Section 601(c)(1) is likely to recur. On
February 2, 2011, a currently pending bill introduced in the Oregon
legislature asked the cell phone industry to place disclosure notices
stating that the safety of the devices has not been established in cell
phone packaging.253 San Francisco has adopted an ordinance requiring
disclosure of the amount of RF radiation emitted by cell phones, which is
currently being challenged in federal district court in part on the theory
that the ordinance is preempted.254
More broadly, on the question of whether Congress may statutorily
grant authority to regulate while withholding implied authority to
preempt, the Third Circuit’s decision conflicts in principle with decisions
construing the Nutrition Labeling in Education Act (“NLEA”), which
similarly disclaims implied preemptive effect.255 In conflict with the

Commc’ns of Ill. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 349 F.3d 402, 410 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting
challenges to Illinois statute mandating methodology for determining rate that local
telephone company could charge to use its network).
250
Farina, 625 F.3d at 131.
251
Id. at 132.
252
Murray, 982 A.2d at 778 n.19.
253
The pending bill (designated LC 1273 in the state legislature) would require a
warning on cell phone packages and the back of the phones stating:
This is a radio-frequency (RF), radiation emitting device that has nonthermal biological
effects for which no safety guidelines have yet been established. Controversy exists as to
whether these effects are harmful to humans. Exposure to RF radiation may be reduced
by limiting your use of this device and keeping away from the head and body. See
Cecilia Kang, Oregon considers cell phone radiation label, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2011/02/oregon_state_senator_chip_shie.
html.
254
See CTIA - Wireless Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 685 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2012).
255
See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 6(c)(1),
104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (NLEA “shall not be construed to preempt any provision of State
law, unless such provision is expressly preempted”).
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Third Circuit, courts have held that this provision precludes implied
preemption.256 Also contrary to the Third Circuit’s treatment of
Section 601(c)(1), the FDA reads the NLEA provision to “clearly
manifest[] Congress’s intention” that there be no preemption under the
NLEA outside the scope of that statute’s express preemption
provision.257
Other statutes, too new to have been addressed in litigation, also
expressly limit or eliminate any implied preemptive effect.258
For
example, Section 1041(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act states:
Relation to Other Provisions of Enumerated Consumer Laws
That Relate to State Law.—No provision of this title, except as
provided in section 1083, shall be construed as modifying,
limiting, or superseding the operation of any provision of an
enumerated consumer law that relates to the application of a law
in effect in any State with respect to such Federal law.259

256

Compare Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009),
Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009), and
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y.
2007), with Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d 1, 7-9 (Cal.
2004) (finding a state law impliedly preempted notwithstanding a savings clause directed
expressly to that state law).
257
State Petitions Requesting Exemption From Federal Preemption, 56 Fed. Reg.
60,528, 60,530 (Nov. 27, 1991) (codified as 21 C.F.R. pt. 100); see State Petitions
Requesting Exemption From Federal Preemption, 58 Fed. Reg. 2462 (Jan. 6, 1993)
(codified as 21 C.F.R. pt. 100) (“[T]he only State requirements that are subject to
preemption are those that are affirmatively different on matters that are covered by [the
express preemption provision] of the act.”) (emphasis added).
258
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1041, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). “Sec. 1041(a)(2) states: “Rule of
Construction.—This title, other than sections 1044 through 1048, may not be construed
as annulling, altering, or affecting, or exempting any person subject to the provisions of
this title from complying with, the statutes, regulations, orders, or interpretations in effect
in any State, except to the extent that any such provision of law is inconsistent with the
provisions of this title, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.”
259
Id. at § 1041(b); see also Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
110-314, § 231, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008). Section 231 states:
Rule With Regard to Preemption.—The provisions of [statutes implemented
by the Consumer Product Safety Commission] establishing the extent to
which those Acts preempt, limit, or otherwise affect any other Federal,
State, or local law, any rule, procedure, or regulation, or any cause of action
under State or local law may not be expanded or contracted in scope, or
limited, modified or extended in application, by any rule or regulation
thereunder, or by reference in any preamble, statement of policy, executive
branch statements, or other matter associated with the publication of any
such rule or regulation. In accordance with the provisions of those Acts, the
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The Third Circuit’s reasoning calls into doubt the efficacy of and
deference afforded to these deliberate attempts by Congress to limit the
preemptive scope of important enactments, and will encourage litigants
and courts to ascribe implied preemptive effect to regulations promulgated under these laws in defiance of Congress’s expressly stated intent.
This question will only grow in importance in light of Congress’s
increasing use of no-implied-preemption clauses. To ensure that states do
not misunderstand the scope of the authority they retain this split requires
definitive resolution by the Supreme Court.
Apart from violating Congress’s express declaration that there
should be “no implied preemption” of state law rights is the disturbing
deference given to the FCC’s guidelines—admittedly adopted by the
FCC not under the FCA, TCA or within any sphere of the agency’s
specific expertise, but NEPA—a general statute applicable to all federal
agencies.
The FCC guidelines held to bar Farina’s state law breach of
warranty claims do not impose a substantive standard on wireless
phones. Rather, as the regulation and the regulatory history make clear,
47 C.F.R.§ 2.1093(c) states the level of RF radiation that a cell phone
can emit without triggering the FCC’s NEPA obligation to evaluate the
device’s environmental effect before authorizing the device for sale. The
FCC did not issue the standard to impose a substantive obligation on
companies, but merely acted “[t]o meet its responsibilities under
NEPA.”260
Accordingly, if a company applies for authorization to sell a cell
phone that does not meet the standard, FCC regulations do not require
the FCC to reject the application or the company to make any change to
its product. They require only the preparation of an environmental
assessment before the application can be granted.261 Similarly, meeting
the FCC “guidelines” does not mean that the company is in compliance
with some federal requirement that displaces any others to which it might
Commission may not construe any such Act as preempting any cause of
action under State or local common law or State statutory law regarding
damage claims.
260
Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation, 11
F.C.C. Rcd. at 15,125; see Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and
Order, 100 F.CC.2d at 561 (“Although the Commission has neither the expertise nor the
authority to develop its own health and safety standards, we are required by the national
Environmental policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1976) to consider
whether Commission actions will significantly affect the quality of the human
environment.”).
261
See Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation Report and Order, 100
F.C.C.2d at 560.
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be subject. It means only that the agency does not have to take the
procedural steps required by NEPA before it acts.262
To be sure, cell phone manufacturers have generally chosen to stay
within the level stated in the guidelines so as to avoid the delay that
would result if the FCC required the requisite NEPA analysis.
Nonetheless, the regulation is, by express statement of the FCC, a
regulation issued to implement NEPA.263 And NEPA is a procedural
statute that “does not mandate particular results” but rather “imposes
only procedural requirements on federal agencies.”264
No court has ever before held that an agency’s decision to
categorically exclude an action from NEPA’s procedural requirements
preempts application of state substantive law applicable to private
conduct.265 And, in contrast to the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit in
Pinney found no preemption in part because the regulations on which the
preemption theory was based were promulgated pursuant to NEPA, not
pursuant to any mandate of or delegated authority under the FCA or
TCA.266
The Third Circuit’s holding has implications for numerous federal
regulatory agencies, regulated entities, and the public.
NEPA’s
requirements apply to every agency and to any action that might have a
significant environmental effect.267 Under the Third Circuit’s analysis,
agency regulations identifying regulatory actions that will not trigger
NEPA requirements could have broad substantive, preemptive effect on
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See id.
47 C.F.R. § 2.1093(a) (“Requirements of this section are a consequence of
Commission responsibilities under [NEPA] to evaluate the environmental significance of
its actions.”); Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation,
11 F.C.C. Rcd. at 15,125; FCC, Guidelines for Evaluating the Environmental Effects of
Radiofrequency Radiation, 12 F.C.C. Rcd. at 13,499 (amending parts of 1996 guidelines
and reiterating that rules issued to comply with NEPA).
264
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350 (“[I]t is now well settled that NEPA itself
does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.”).
265
Murray addressed the fact that the FCC’s RF regulations are NEPA regulations
only in a footnote, finding that the distinction between NEPA regulations and substantive
regulations was “not . . . important.” The court suggested that by instructing the FCC to
finalize its pending rulemaking, the TCA had somehow transformed the NEPA guideline
into a substantive requirement. 982 A.2d at 778 n.19.
266
Pinney, 402 F.3d at 457; see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978) (“NEPA does not repeal by implication
any other statute.”) (citation omitted).
267
See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
263
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state laws regulating the conduct of the private actors whose activities
would be considered in a NEPA analysis, if one were required.268
Similarly, under the Third Circuit’s approach, agency decisions that
an environmental assessment is not required in particular cases because
of the absence of a significant environmental impact could suddenly
operate to preempt the application of state environmental, safety, health,
and consumer protection standards to the underlying private conduct.
Yet “it is apparent that the express intent of NEPA is not to exclude state
environmental regulation, but to encourage cooperation with local
governments to achieve the Congressional goal of environmental protection.”269 Indeed, NEPA has long co-existed with an array of state
environmental laws.270
The potential wide ranging effect of arguments of “NEPA
preemption” are far-reaching, and have further muddied the waters of the
already murky preemption pond. When this issue eventually reaches the
United States Supreme Court, as it almost certainly will, the Court
should respect the explicit directives of Congress in the TCA, and reject
the sweeping preemption adopted by the Third Circuit in Farina.
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See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 372.5(c) (2013); 10 C.F.R. § 1021.410 (2011); 18 C.F.R.
§ 380.5 (2012); 21 C.F.R. §§ 25.30–25.34,; Bureau of Land Mgmt., Dep’t of Interior, 516
Dep’tal Manual 11, § 11.8(b) (2008).
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Joan Newman, Comment, A Consideration of Federal Preemption in the Context
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(1990).
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